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Navigating the “Bureaucratic Beast” in
North Carolina Hurricane Recovery
Amanda J. Reinke and Erin R. Eldridge
Hurricane Florence swept up the eastern United States coast and slowly moved through North Carolina as a tropical storm in
September 2018. Producing twenty to thirty inches of rain, Florence caused dangerous flooding, displacement, and widespread
wind damage and power outages. While coastal areas were hard hit by the storm, many impoverished in-land areas spanning
multiple river basins were also heavily flooded. Although the winds have ceased and the waters receded, the disaster continues
to unfold in bureaucratic contexts with uneven effects temporally and spatially for affected locals. Local organizations and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency assess damages, process funding applications, and work to rebuild. Drawing on ten
months of ethnographic research in Cumberland County, NC, we illuminate the ways in which the temporality of bureaucratic
processes is a form of bureaucratic violence that exacerbates suffering in the context of crisis and how local organizations
attempt to recover and rebuild in the face of pervasive top-down bureaucratic obstacles.
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I

Introduction

n September of 2018, Hurricane Florence swept up the
eastern United States coast and slowly moved through
North Carolina as a tropical storm. It was the wettest
tropical storm on record for the Carolinas, producing twenty
to thirty inches of rain, but also causing dangerous flooding,
displacement, and widespread wind damage and power outages. Coastal areas such as New Bern and Wilmington were
hard hit by the storm, but many in-land areas in multiple river
basins were also heavily flooded. Some of the most impoverished areas of North Carolina are in the southeastern part
of the state—areas heavily impacted by Hurricane Matthew
in 2016 and again by Florence. As the region tries to recover
and rebuild, affected individuals and communities face longterm bureaucratic obstacles and challenges in applying for
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) funding
as well as charity support and assistance.
This article draws on ten months of ethnographic research in North Carolina to demonstrate how bureaucratic
processes exacerbate suffering in the context of crisis and
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how local communities and organizations attempt to recover
and rebuild in the face of pervasive top-down bureaucratic
obstacles. Bureaucracies associated with disasters include
FEMA but also include local long-term recovery groups
(LTRGs), charity organizations, and volunteers all seeking to help affected communities and individuals. In this
article, we consider bureaucracies not as stagnant entities
but rather dynamic in form, process, and personnel. We
contextualize recovery obstacles as bureaucratic violence,
a form of everyday violence in which “red tape” perpetuates
suffering for citizens.

Methods
Our research is in Cumberland County, North Carolina,
which is situated along the Cape Fear River. Many areas
of Cumberland County are prone to flooding, and flood
waters can become especially dangerous during a storm, as
wastewater plants, large industrial animal farm operations,
and coal ash water sites become inundated throughout the
broader River Basin. Cumberland County includes the city
of Fayetteville, several towns such as Spring Lake and Hope
Mills, and is also adjacent to the United States Army’s Fort
Bragg military installation, the largest United States Army
post by population (see Figure 1).
This project investigates nonprofit, state, and local
government employees’ and affected community members’
perceptions of hurricane recovery efforts, specifically the
bureaucratic processes and interplay among organizations
operating in the region. Primary data collection in Cumberland County began in September 2018 immediately after the
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Figure 1. USGS Map of Cumberland County, Including Fayetteville, Spring Lake, Hope Mills, and the
Cape Fear River

storm and is ongoing. While both researchers are trained in
disaster studies and violence theories, our interests in this
project initially began because Erin Eldridge was working
and residing in Fayetteville during Hurricane Florence.
Given her firsthand experience of the storm and research
experience on the political ecological impacts of disasters
in the southeastern United States and Amanda’s background
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working violence literatures, especially bureaucratic and
administrative violence, we obtained swift IRB approval to
begin ethnographic investigation in the wake of the storm.
Given pre-existing contacts and networks in the area with
various nonprofits, we were quickly allowed access to public
and private events and activities for observation and, as a
result, possible interviewees.
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The authors have conducted semi-structured interviews
with over twenty participants, as well as one interviewturned-focus group with twenty-three participants. Interview
participants include government, nonprofit, and contract
employees who are directly serving the Cumberland County
area by assessing on-the-ground needs, processing paperwork, and providing direct financial or material support to
affected locals.
In addition to semi-structured interviews, we have also
engaged in non-participant observation and informal interviews at nonprofit meetings, a local town hall, a disaster
preparation workshop, a mold remediation workshop, a national disaster volunteers meeting, crisis counseling outreach
events, and at a FEMA outreach location. Participants include
local, national, and international nonprofit employees, as well
as locals affected by the recent hurricanes in the area. Several
of the workers and volunteers we interviewed and observed
were also directly affected by the storm and provided key
insights into understanding their perspective as both survivor
and relief or recovery provider.

Bureaucratic Violence in Disasters
As anthropologists have argued elsewhere (Bear and
Mathur 2015; Bernstein and Mertz 2011; Eldridge 2018;
Eldridge and Reinke 2018; Gupta 2012; Reinke 2018), bureaucracies are not stagnant structures but rather are dynamic,
interactive sociocultural worlds that shape everyday realities
in myriad ways. Within bureaucratic spaces, decisions are
made, knowledge is produced, power is shifted, and values
and goals are imagined and reimagined (Bernstein and Mertz
2011; Eldridge and Reinke 2018). Although bureaucratic entities may be depicted as monolithic institutions, ethnographic
inquiry has revealed their existence as a “hyper-credentialized
world” (Graeber 2015:41), where documentation is key in
the struggle for access to resources (Sheehan 2018); where
relationships among corporations, law, and human rights
regimes continually shift (Guyol-Meinrath Echeverry 2018);
and where power dynamics between settler-colonial states and
Indigenous peoples are reified (Kim 2018). People control
these bureaucratic spaces and processes, and their decisions
have on-the-ground impacts for citizens.
Connecting research on bureaucracies with studies on the
multiple dimensions of violence, scholars also point to the
ways in which violence is enacted and perpetuated through
normalized administrative processes and decision making
(Eldridge 2018; Eldridge and Reinke 2018; Graeber 2015;
Gupta 2012; Rajan 2001; Tyner and Rice 2015). S. Ravi Rajan
(2001), for example, illustrates how bureaucratic violence
plays out in the aftermath of the Bhopal catastrophe, describing bureaucratic violence as an “everyday form of violence”
delivered by bureaucrats that manifests through several
processes, including the absence of effective regulation and
emergency planning, the lack of transparency, and bureaucratic rituals, routines, and accounting that inadequately
address pain and suffering. Similarly, in an examination of
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coal ash calamities, Erin Eldridge (2018) reveals the role of
bureaucratic absence, delays, inaction, and interference in the
socioecological violence normalized and perpetuated through
coal ash policies and practices and how those processes effect on-the-ground realities in communities living near coal
ash waste sites.
Scholars have also investigated the bureaucratic infrastructures that variously construct and underscore vulnerabilities in disaster aftermaths and qualifications for recovery and
relief support. During Hurricane Katrina recovery efforts, as
described by Reid (2013), FEMA policies and practices that
assumed a “middle-class” family structure model for rental
relief underscored the problematic distinction between the
“deserving” victims and the “undeserving” welfare cheats.
FEMA’s “unclear and slow-moving” rental assistance review
process specifically left those in low economic standing and
in extended or shared households waiting in precarious living
situations, leading to sociotemporal marginalization (Reid
2013). Investigating two New Orleans neighborhoods following Katrina, Kroll-Smith, Baxter, and Jenkins (2015:89)
detail how disaster assistance became a source of “profound
anxiety and fatigue” or even “a second calamity” due to the
“vagaries of eligibility criteria” and the obstacle-laden paths
many people had to navigate to access individual assistance
from FEMA. Veronica Pareja (2019) similarly examines the
“second storm” of Superstorm Sandy, referring to the bureaucratic and legal entanglements experienced by homeowners
during the recovery process. In this case, abstruse grant and
loan processes and fraudulent insurance practices stymied
the ability of thousands of homeowners to receive FEMA
relief and insurance coverage needed to rebuild their homes.
In these contexts, bureaucracy manifests in many forms
with outcomes that span the violence continuum (Eldridge
and Reinke 2018; Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004), which
encompasses overlapping dimensions of physical, structural
(Farmer 2004), symbolic (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2004),
and slow violence (Nixon 2011). In particular, the pace of
bureaucratic work enacts violence on those affected by disaster. Bureaucratic regimes and much of the disaster research
and literature rely upon linear models of time to consider the
impacts and effects of disaster. Studies of “during disaster”
time consider the ways in which normative and structural
marginalization become enhanced, uncertainty pronounced,
and human-environment relations altered (Petersen 2014;
Rodríguez-Giralt, Tirado, and Tironi 2014). Researchers
studying disaster aftermaths consider the technologies of
recovery, official and unofficial narratives of disasters and
bureaucratic response, and reconfigurations of political subjectivities (Easthope and Mort 2014; Roberts 2006; Tironi
2014). Pre-disaster time is framed as anticipatory and a time
for preparedness, precaution, and mitigation—a time to prevent or lessen a hazard’s impact on loss of life and economy
(Anderson 2010; FEMA 2017a; Weszkalnys 2014).
Despite widespread use of linear time among disaster policymakers, practitioners, and scholars, disasters do not unfold
linearly and uniformly across time and space. Disasters, which
119

are prefigured by human relationships with the biophysical
world, may manifest from a variety of slow and rapid-onset
processes and thus have root causes and triggering agents
that are discontinuous across time and space (Oliver-Smith
2002). Bureaucratic decisions in disaster contexts are made
at varying scales and intervals, leading to uneven landscapes
of preparedness, relief, and recovery. Bureaucratic violence
can thus unfold as a form of “slow violence” (Nixon 2011:26), with dispersed effects and a pace that evades visibility
and media scrutiny. Lingering impacts can affect feelings
of time for those experiencing disaster. For example, David
Scott (2014) conceptualizes time in the aftermath of political
catastrophe as a “stalled present” in which those affected by
catastrophe develop an awareness and attunement to time;
time during aftermaths becomes visible and conspicuous.
Following the above conceptualizations, we consider
how the bureaucratic regimes of disaster recovery, especially
FEMA applications and decision making, affect the everyday
realities of disaster recovery for disaster-affected communities. In this paper, we frame the stalled present of bureaucratic
processes, including applying for assistance and waiting for
recovery, as a form of bureaucratic violence. To illustrate
how those bureaucratic processes not only inadequately
address suffering, but also compound it, this paper focuses
first on government recovery processes from federal to city
levels and then describes how those processes play out in
Cumberland County.

FEMA and the Top-Down “Bureaucratic
Beast” of Disaster Recovery
Until the mid-twentieth century, federal spending on
disasters in the United States was minimal but gradually
expanded following the 1927 Mississippi Flood and a series
of legislative actions (Jerolleman 2019), such as the Federal
Disaster Relief Act of 1950, the National Flood Insurance
Act (1968), and Disaster Relief Act amendments throughout the early 1970s. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency was created in April 1979 by then President Jimmy
Carter to consolidate federal disaster-related activities into
one agency. FEMA is primarily responsible for coordinating
the federal government’s disaster preparedness, prevention,
mitigation, response, and recovery. In 1988, the Stafford Act
became the centerpiece of disaster legislation policy, defining
key terminology, cost-sharing plans, and mitigation. FEMA
is responsible for following the Act’s provisions as well as
coordinating, provisioning, and disseminating relief according to the Act, which was later amended in 2000 (see Moss,
Schellhamer, and Berman 2009).
In the aftermath of 9/11, FEMA became subsumed under
the then-newly created Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). This move continues to pose organizational and
logistical challenges for FEMA as the agency navigates the
increased bureaucratization of their work within the broader
Department (Dave 2015; Maltz 2019). FEMA’s subsequent
failures during Hurricanes Katrina and Maria have been
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widely criticized and have long-term repercussions for the
economic, sociocultural, and political well-being and relationships of those living in affected areas (Browne 2013; Craemer
2010; Dave 2015; Maltz 2019; White House 2006).
FEMA plays an important role in the aftermath of domestic disasters. When FEMA is activated for a disaster zone,
they provide immediate relief support and provide financial
support for long-term recovery efforts to individuals, local
governments, and nonprofits. For example, FEMA grants
provide some financial assistance to individuals affected by
a federally declared disaster, including funds for temporary
housing, rental assistance, home repairs, and other needs.
Grants, which are adjusted annually, are typically capped
at levels that do not cover full restoration; grant recipients
living in FEMA designated flood zones are also required
to purchase and maintain flood insurance on the damaged
property. A related federal agency provides Small Business
Administration (SBA) loans, which can be paired with FEMA
grants. SBA loans vary in interest rates and amount, but they
can be allotted to individuals as well as businesses. SBA is
a loan and must be paid back, whereas FEMA grants are a
lump sum provided to successful applicants with no expectation of repayment.
Some of our research participants in Cumberland County
have not been approved by FEMA or SBA but have extensive
damage to their properties from Florence, while others have
been approved by FEMA or SBA but for amounts that are
far less than the costs of repairing damages. Both FEMA and
SBA processes are highly bureaucratic. The applications are
cumbersome and technocratic but key to accessing much
needed financial resources. Locals express frustration at the
paperwork required to evidence damages and the number of
community and city meetings they attend where they seem to
only receive more pamphlets rather than substantive support
in evidencing damage, completing paperwork, and followingup with FEMA and SBA on appeals. At outreach events, they
were frequently told by FEMA representatives to “call the
1-800 number” with their questions and concerns—a suggestion that only garnered more frustration for disaster survivors
who have spent untold numbers of hours completing paperwork and waiting on hold for FEMA support and assistance.
At the county and nonprofit levels, FEMA funnels funds
through numerous state agencies for appropriation to disaster relief and recovery. Reflecting on funding for Hurricane
Matthew, Cumberland County Commissioner Keefe stated
(Barnes 2018), “I think history will reflect that the biggest
disaster to come out of Hurricane Matthew was the funding
model used to help communities get back on their feet.”
Following Matthew, North Carolina was deemed a “Slow
Spender State” because it took over a year for officials to
process federal funds. State administrators suggested that the
slow pace is a result of previous cuts in state staff with the
expertise for handling grants, as well as the shift of disaster
rebuilding programs from the Commerce Department to the
Department of Public Safety (Thrush 2018). To further illustrate, a report from the NC Legislature noted that as of March
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2019, the state had only spent 3.1 percent of the $236.5 million
Community Block Development Grant for Disaster Recovery
(CBDG-DR) provided by the Department of Housing and
Development (North Carolina General Assembly 2019).
For federally declared disasters, FEMA will pay at least
75 percent for state recovery and rebuilding projects, and
the remaining costs are covered by state and local governments. According to a staff member in the Fayetteville city
office, this financial cost sharing between bureaucratic levels
looks like it will be about the same for Hurricane Florence.
The local government in this case reportedly did not have
to foot the bill for Hurricane Matthew nor will they need to
for Florence, although they may have undertaken additional
projects of their own accord that were not funded by the state
or federal levels.
At the city level, repairs take time, with weeks to months
added once federal funding is applied due to the related increase of bureaucratic and administrative requirements. In
the case of both Matthew and Florence, this timing meant
that the full scope of required repairs was not assessed until
the holiday seasons, and bids did not go out until the early
months of the following year. During this time, the “stalled
present” is visible on the landscape via private and public
infrastructures, such as culverts and dams, still damaged from
Matthew and awaiting repairs.
The slow top-down approach to recovery is perceived by
our disaster-affected local community interlocutors as government complacency or disinterest in making repairs. Making
these bureaucratic processes even more complex are layers of
damages. Repairs were not complete from Matthew, and some
of that infrastructure was subsequently damaged by Florence. One interviewee working with the city exclaimed that
managing multiple levels of government and funds for two
separate disasters has created a “big obnoxious bureaucratic
beast,” and as projects are carried out, they have to “document it, document it, document it” with special attention to
which disaster caused what damage. While bureaucratization
manifests as detailed documentation, abstruse paperwork,
and slow-moving rebuilding projects for city planners and
engineers, for many survivors, bureaucratic disaster recovery processes can create, exacerbate, and perpetuate states
of precarity.

Local Organizations Managing the
“Bureaucratic Beast” in Cumberland County
Unlike Hurricane Matthew, which quickly hit Cumberland County in 2016 and led to immediate and drastic impacts,
Florence progressed through the state as a slow moving
tropical storm, providing local and state officials more time
to prepare and encourage residents to clean out storm drains,
stock up on supplies, and evacuate vulnerable areas along the
Cape Fear and Little Rivers. In Fayetteville and other cities,
officials set up 24-hour call centers and began mobilizing
emergency response teams. As the storm neared the state’s
coast, FEMA began staging supplies at Fort Bragg.
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The gradual pace of the storm, bringing heavy rains over
several days, however, meant water levels in some areas
exceeded the levels recorded for Hurricane Matthew. While
there was some overlap between areas flooded by Matthew
and Florence, the persistent, heavy rains also led to flooding
in new areas, as well as areas outside of floodplains, which
caught some communities off guard. In the months following Florence, the southeastern region of the state continued
to get heavy doses of rain, making it difficult for homeowners affected by the tropical storm to effectively dry out their
houses, prevent further property damage, and in some cases,
return to their homes after displacement.
Residents impacted by hurricanes in Cumberland County
are directed toward several resources during and after storms,
and a major coordinating body in the county is the county’s
LTRG, the Cumberland Disaster Recovery Coalition (CDRC).
The coalition formed in response to a large tornado event
that swept through the region in 2011 and brought together a
range of nonprofits, faith-based, and charitable organizations
to address the long-term concerns and unmet needs when
federal assistance and insurance pay-outs are unavailable or
exhausted. Predominantly funded by Church World Services,
it is comprised of several subcommittees involved in case
management, unmet needs, finance, volunteer management,
as well as other tasks.
When Hurricane Matthew hit in 2016, CDRC’s headquarters flooded, complicating its efforts, but over the years, they
have managed to pull together dozens of partner organizations. The coalition frequently mentions the reputation they
built as a recovery organization during Matthew, enabling
them to respond more quickly and efficiently to Florence. In
fact, a 2017 FEMA news release entitled “Long Term Recovery Begins at the Local Level” focuses entirely on CDRC as
an exemplary recovery organization (FEMA 2017b).
Long-term recovery groups like CDRC often must
juggle cases from multiple disasters and they, like city
managers for redevelopment, must track funding from
Matthew and Florence projects separately in order to
position themselves for future funding. On the ground,
these lines can be blurry due to the slow recovery process
for Matthew and in cases of dual disaster impact. The
ever-thinning funding for Matthew, but continued influx
of residents coming forward requesting support and assistance for Matthew damages, is an additional challenge.
The care taken by CDRC and similar organizations to
position themselves for future funding illustrates the
broader challenge of being a local organization partnered
with larger umbrella organizations, as well as a not-forprofit charity in a profit-driven economy. As Vincanne
Adams (2013:165) notes in Markets of Sorrow, Labors
of Faith, nonprofit relief organizations sometimes must
“hover uncomfortably in the zone between being private
nonprofit and corporate-like for-profit.” To sustain their
organization, they must, at times, operate like a business
and “compete for increasingly stretched resources from
both private and public sources.”
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In terms of case work, CDRC was still receiving Matthew
cases during mid-2019 as they also assisted with Florence
recovery. Matthew cases sometimes surface as FEMA-funded
crisis counselors identify people who have fallen through the
cracks and never received any assistance. In other situations,
CDRC receives cases that have been in the hands of North
Carolina recovery agencies. There have been situations where
CDRC has caseworkers ready and resources for unmet needs,
but getting the state to turn over cases to them requires legal
“wrangling” with contracts and agreements. The state is not
only slow about turning over cases, but accessing data can
be frustrating. For example, when CDRC received a dozen
password protected Matthew cases from the state, it took additional days just to get the password. Upon access, some of
the cases had already been seen and/or rejected by CDRC’s
unmet needs committee but were not closed for technical
reasons like the presence of white-out on a form. While these
incidences may seem small, they accumulate and add to the
frustration of recovery work.
Among the Matthew cases to surface in the CDRC office
in 2019 was the case of one man whose roof was damaged
during Matthew and, because it was never properly repaired,
leaked again during Florence. The damage allowed water to
come into his house through the vent above his stove. According to him, he was initially denied FEMA funding after
Matthew purportedly because the flood waters only came into
his yard and not into his home. He was additionally denied
assistance from a faith-based recovery group operating at
the time because their caseworker incorrectly thought he
had a lien on his house, which disqualified him. During a
conversation at his home, he mentioned nearly giving up and
feeling like “just a name on a list” after over two years. CDRC
picked the case back up in 2019 and found that the lien had
been in the 1990s and should not have been a disqualifying
factor following Matthew. CDRC was able to pull funding
from their unmet needs committee and partners to fix his roof.
This case exemplifies CDRC’s ability to adapt and channel resources more efficiently than federal agencies, such as
FEMA; however, their ability to do so is generally attributed
to their longstanding existence in the community and experience with prior disaster events, including Matthew. Other
newly created or poorly organized NC LTRGs may have
compromised abilities to navigate these bureaucratic processes collectively, adding to delays in the pace of recovery.
Many research participants described dysfunctional aspects of
neighboring LTRGs, such as favoritism, community discord,
and “lots of fighting.” At a CDRC meeting, for example,
one member said he heard about people nearly “coming to
blows” with Lutheran Services, and in another county, state
disaster caseworkers were kicked out of a committee meeting.
These organizational challenges impede a group’s ability to
adequately and promptly address diverse community needs
and add to recovery delays for survivors.
Additionally, recovery and relief organizations face
bureaucratic obstacles from both public and private funders.
While state recovery efforts can be painfully slow, grants
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from private charitable organizations may have strict spending criteria that do not mesh with the pace of organizations
providing services in communities. Barrios (2017) described
these constraints in his research following hurricane Mitch in
Honduras and Katrina in New Orleans; he found that not only
did disaster survivors have difficulty securing the resources
needed to recover in meaningful ways, but aid agencies were
constrained by cost-benefit analyses that pressured institutional actors to spend budgets within specific time frames. In
Cumberland County, the director of a food bank echoed this
challenge during an interview as he described grant spending
requirements that only address short-term needs and limit the
development of long-term goals. According to him, “This
is not just an overnight fix…[the donor] gave us $100,000
and this is for the next 30 days. Wait a second, you know,
let me spread this out…because this is not going to be over
in 30 days.” These disparities in timing and pace aggravate
already-existing hardships of recovery.

The Violent Effects of the “Bureaucratic
Beast” for Locals
While organizations like CDRC are more connected to
local needs and realities than state and federal agencies and
liaisons, recovery processes are still shaped and constrained
by broader disaster recovery institutions. In Cumberland
County, CDRC directs people to first apply with FEMA.
Whether they are approved or denied is typically irrelevant
for LTRG assistance; the application and subsequent numerical identifier assists CDRC and local recovery groups while
tracking and moving individuals forward in their recovery
needs assessment and support process.
Although FEMA sets up outreach posts in places like
Lowes and Home Depot in the months following a disaster,
individuals are likely to meet FEMA representatives that are
not tuned into local needs and are given a stack of wordy
pamphlets on the FEMA process. The FEMA representatives
we spoke to at one of these locations had been shuffled from
various disaster relief and recovery stations; they were not
from the area and were unfamiliar with the topography, disaster impacts, and pre-existing inequalities and vulnerabilities.
Their stay would be brief before they were reassigned to
other federal assistance locations. One interviewee described
FEMA representatives as “unbelievably rude” to the extent
that they were yelling at the elderly and at other individuals
who had difficulty understanding and completing their FEMA
assistance applications.
People do not immediately apply for FEMA assistance
for various reasons, including unfamiliarity with available
assistance programs, confusion, doubts about qualifications,
ambitions to do house repairs on their own, fear of government, difficulty getting signatures from all family members
listed on property titles, and other obstacles. For example,
recovery workers shared their challenges in reaching immigrant and non-native English-speaking communities who
fear the government and simultaneously do not want to be
HUMAN ORGANIZATION

perceived as accepting a government handout. For individuals
who do apply for FEMA assistance, the bureaucratic processes of recovery amplify the disaster’s emotional toll. An
interviewee assisting in shelters reflects on working with the
elderly: “Some of them were well in their eighties; they could
barely move. They had to apply for FEMA and the elderly
sometimes have a really hard time either hearing you or understanding you or just in general can’t really communicate
well.” A roofing contractor reflected on the biggest challenges
individuals face in recovery: “The challenge is the red tape”
in FEMA applications but also in procuring and navigating
recovery support from other organizations. At the time of our
interview in August 2019, he had yet to meet any survivors
that received FEMA assistance.
The paperwork itself is cumbersome and abstruse, and
many applicants are denied because they clicked an incorrect
button, checked the wrong box, or did not provide all the
required information. Several of the cases described by case
workers were initially denied assistance by FEMA because
their paperwork was completed or filed incorrectly. Even
after navigating the initial paperwork, people can be denied
if FEMA inspectors deem their home livable. According to
one recovery worker, applicants “get denied and they get
discouraged and they’re like, ‘Well, they denied me’” and
give up (personal communication, 2019). The disappointment
after an initial denial dissuades many from appealing a FEMA
denial. One woman was denied for FEMA assistance twice
after losing her home and personal items: “You’re looking
at a woman who has three kids, single mom, and they have
four feet of water in her rental property and she got denied.
What? Was that not enough damage?” This client was lucky;
a “guardian angel” [disaster caseworker] helped her appeal
with FEMA, and by January 2019, she was approved for
temporary housing assistance and personal items.
FEMA’s voluntary liaisons did receive some praise
from disaster recovery groups and staff. According to a local nonprofit disaster recovery staff member, working with
the voluntary liaisons is far more effective than trying to call
FEMA or work with their paid representatives:
We love them because if we were to go directly to big
FEMA, they would shut the door on us. But you have these
voluntary FEMA liaisons…and then they come back and
give us the information that we need. So anytime we have
questions, they’re able to answer us and it’s been good. We
love them. We love them, we love having them at the table!

By contrast, survivor experiences with the agency, its liaisons, as well as state recovery programs were much less positive. One Fayetteville resident—a veteran and grandmother—
has been displaced from her home since Hurricane Matthew.
The floodwaters went just below the floor line and entered
her home through a hole in the floor. The pipes in the house
burst after the storm, contributing to water damage. Since
the water did not rise into her home, she was denied house
repair assistance from FEMA and local recovery groups. The
reason for denial was described by her caseworker as a “lack
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of maintenance.” FEMA and local organizations helped her
with temporary shelter and, eventually, access to a mobile
home, but after two years, her house still sits abandoned and
deteriorating. She stated that she did the paperwork and “got
a number” but feels like a name at the bottom of the list. As
she waits to hear about other possibilities for assistance from
the state and other organizations, she described feeling like
her life is at a “standstill” and bogged down with paperwork.
“The storm’s gone, but the paperwork is still there…. The
storm ain’t nothing compared to the paperwork,” she stated
during a conversation outside her now mold-infested home.
As the conversation continued, she mentioned disaster recovery paperwork numerous times, describing it as “the killer”
and a “monster.”
In Spring Lake, where there was heavy flooding during
Florence, a resident described a stalled present. She, her
husband, and their two grandchildren live in a neighborhood
devastated by Florence but did not have flood insurance
because they live in an area designated as low risk. Eight
months after the flooding, the family was still living together
in a small apartment trying to repair their home. While they
qualified for and received over $30,000 for home repairs
and temporary housing from FEMA, the estimated damage
exceeded $100,000. They also qualified for an SBA loan and
received home insurance pay-outs for tree damage but still
exhausted their savings and continue to run up a credit card
debt to pay for mortgage, rent, storage fees, and other bills. As
they began home repairs, a FEMA representative suggested
they apply for a state program aimed at quick home repairs
to restore minimal living conditions. When they applied, the
assessor told them to halt construction on their home because
if they received the grant, the state would cover construction. After halting construction and waiting for a month, the
resident called only to find out that she would be receiving
a rejection letter. Not only were they rejected because they
had too much damage to their home to qualify, but work on
their home was stalled, and they had to find new contractors.
She described being forced to sit and wait in this situation as
“an injustice.” Emotionally, she describes “being in a numb
place,” and “losing sight” of who she is anymore.
Federal assistance for disaster survivors not only requires
the rigorous application process, familiarity with institutional
communication styles (Browne 2013), and a lot of time but
also the capacity to carefully track and document interactions
with organizations and expenses in the context of crisis, displacement, and loss. The rules and regulations of government
programs are designed to reduce fraud or the duplication of
benefits. Jerolleman (2019) explains that most fraud cases are
not a result of intentional theft but rather programmatic and
contractor errors; yet, post-disaster case studies show that
narratives and fears of funding misuse are common and place
the added burden of proof on funding recipients.
Once assistance is successfully received, the recovery
money must be tracked carefully with receipts. CDRC
representatives repeatedly remind applicants to “keep their
receipts,” record their expenditures, and abide by the spending
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guidelines. They are especially concerned as recovery money
begins to trickle in during the holiday season, and survivors
try to achieve some level of normalcy in their lives. If individuals side-step protocol, they may have difficulty getting
government or charitable assistance in the future.
If individuals are denied federal funding, they are encouraged to appeal, but appeals forms require very precise legal
wording and, like the other application processes, response
times can be slow. During a town hall meeting in Spring Lake,
local residents expressed frustration about the system for
filing claims and appealing denials. Echoing what Katherine
Browne (2013) refers to as the “non-responsive response,”
FEMA liaisons in attendance repeatedly told locals to “call
the 1-800 number” because “everyone’s case is different,”
and they need individual support for their case.
In response, some locals shared experiences about the
institutional indifference they faced. One stated that they were
denied a loan from SBA and despite repeated calls has gotten
no further response to her queries. The SBA representative
on-site responded by saying, “Don’t let that discourage you”
and urged her to keep calling. At the same meeting, a CDRC
representative responded by asking locals to “bear with the
system,” reiterating their obligation to go to FEMA and
SBA for funding first before seeking assistance elsewhere.
While tensions resulting from the “multiple realities and
rationalities” among survivors and recovery organizations
are commonplace following a catastrophe (Oliver-Smith and
Hoffman 2002), the disconnect between institutional protocol
and the immediate needs of survivors became a clear source
of suffering, anxiety, and exhaustion for those already dealing
with the impacts of the disaster.

Conclusion
The “big obnoxious bureaucratic beast” of hurricane
recovery perpetuates violence through technocratic language,
abstruse paperwork and bureaucratic processes, and long
wait times for support. For disaster survivors, “the system” is
characterized by time consuming and confusing bureaucratic
recovery processes. These processes dehumanize survivors
by thrusting them into an unfamiliar technocratic world in
the midst of crisis and reducing them to an application number for case tracking purposes. The pace and complexity of
these processes exacerbate stress and anxiety, contribute to
perpetual states of recovery, and compound feelings of loss,
uncertainty, and helplessness. While some survivors find support and “guardian angels” to help them navigate bureaucratic
processes and, in the event of a FEMA denial, appeal their
claims, many continue living in precarity and uncertainty,
racking up debt to cover expenses spanning two locations.
Suggestions from organizations and FEMA representatives
to “bear with the system” and continue calling helplines are
met with anger, confusion, and frustration.
Disaster researchers have been pointing out the violence
of recovery and relief processes for decades; simultaneously,
individuals within these bureaucratic institutions have also
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pleaded for changes in recovery processes. During statements
addressing lessons learned from 2017 disasters, to illustrate,
former FEMA Administrator Brock Long acknowledged
the need to reduce bureaucratic delays and complexities for
disaster survivors:
FEMA is committed to simplifying our processes and putting survivors first. We must look at ways we can streamline our assistance programs to make FEMA’s programs
as clear and easy as possible for survivors and grantees to
navigate. I have charged my staff with reducing administrative and bureaucratic burdens, so that survivors and
communities receive assistance more quickly. Throughout
the federal government, there are a number of programs
that offer assistance to survivors. We are working with
our partners to streamline and consolidate some of these
activities to ensure survivors can better navigate our various programs. (Long 2018: 6)

While local concerns have reached national platforms,
our study illustrates that little has been effectively done to alleviate the added suffering of bureaucratic recovery processes
for survivors in North Carolina. Not only do federal recovery
processes need streamlining and increased accessibility, state
institutions also need to be better staffed, organized, and
equipped to channel resources and assistance in ways that
facilitate meaningful and rapid recovery. In such efforts,
government agents responsible for making decisions about
resources and spending would better serve constituents by
understanding the ways that bureaucratic processes enact
forms of everyday violence that can alter realities of time,
space, safety, and well-being. For survivors whose lives have
been completely altered or uprooted, the “alien logic and
inflexible systems” of recovery, as Browne (2013) notes,
piles on “new sources of exhaustion and frustration” and adds
“insult to hardship, leaving people with the sense of having
lost control of their lives and futures.” In these contexts, “cultural brokers,” or people adept at navigating cultural “gaps,”
may prove useful in mitigating frustrations and improving
relationships and communication between communities and
the layers of institutions involved in preparation, relief, and
recovery (FEMA 2019).
The slow pace of recovery additionally leaves little
room for long-term planning and development that considers broader climate trends, livelihood security, and the
reduction of vulnerability. As Heijmans (2004) argues,
it is imperative to shift from a “disaster-cycle model” to
“disaster risk-reduction framework”; this is especially
salient considering emerging climate trends predicting
that higher sea levels will make flooding more frequent in
the Carolinas and strengthen storm surges causing them to
travel farther inland (United States Global Change Research
Program 2018). Over one billion dollars in state and federal
funds has been spent on Hurricane Florence recovery alone
(NCDPS 2019), and locals and officials are beginning to
acknowledge the need to avoid not only deaths but also
the costs of rebuilding (Boraks 2019). Disaster risk reduction in the context of frequent catastrophes and changing
HUMAN ORGANIZATION

climate trends, however, requires more than short-term
coping strategies. It requires being attuned to local realities, relationships, and knowledge systems, understanding
the systemic forces that create patterns of exposure and
vulnerability, and rethinking conventional patterns of landuse and social and economic development, especially those
that have prioritized the reduction of social services and
the public sector (Oliver-Smith 2013, 2016).
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